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On the importance of borrowing constraints for house 
price dynamics 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 8/2008 
Essi Eerola – Niku Määttänen 




We study how a household borrowing constraint the the form of a down payment 
requirement affects house price dynamics in an OLG model with standard 
preferences. We find that in certain situations the borrowing constraint shapes 
house price dynamics substantially. The importance of the constraint depends 
very much on whether house price changes are driven by interest rate or aggregate 
income shocks. Moreover, because of the borrowing constraint, house price 
dynamics display substantial asymmetries between large positive and large 
negative income shocks. These results are related to the fact that the share of 
borrowing-constrained households is different following different shocks. 
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Luottorajoitteiden merkitys asuntojen hintadynamiikan 
kannalta 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 8/2008 
Essi Eerola – Niku Määttänen 




Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan kotitalouksien asuntolainoihin liittyvien luotto-
rajoitusten vaikutusta asuntojen hintadynamiikkaan numeerisen limittäisten suku-
polvien mallin avulla. Tietyissä tilanteissa luottorajoitteet vaikuttavat asuntojen 
hintadynamiikkaan merkittävästi. Luottorajoitteen vaikutus riippuu oleellisesti 
siitä, onko asuntojen hintojen muutosten taustalla tulo- vai korkosokki. Luotto-
rajoite vaikuttaa myös hyvin eri tavalla suurten negatiivisten ja suurten positiivis-
ten tulosokkien yhteydessä. Nämä tulokset liittyvät siihen, että mallissa luotto-
rajoitteisten kotitalouksien määrä vaihtelee. 
 
Avainsanat: asuntojen hintadynamiikka, luottorajoitteet, omarahoitusosuus 
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This paper investigates the importance of borrowing constraints for house
price dynamics. We consider an OLG model with owner housing. In
the model, young households need to borrow in order to ﬁnance their
housing and diﬀerences in household size create large diﬀerences in household
leverage also among households of same age. We solve for the house price
dynamics following diﬀerent aggregate shocks contrasting two cases: one
where household borrowing is unlimited and another where households face
a constraint stating that they can borrow only up to a certain fraction of
the value of their house. We are particularly interested in situations where a
substantial fall in house prices reduces the net worth of leveraged households
dramatically. In such situations, the borrowing constraint may become binding
for many households.
In order to focus on the eﬀect of the borrowing constraint, we make
two key simplifying modelling assumptions. The ﬁr s ti st h a tw ea s s u m e
perfect foresight. The second is that we abstract from transaction costs and
other non-convexities in the household problem. These assumptions make
it relatively easy to solve for the fully non-linear dynamics very accurately.
Importantly, they also allow us to derive analytical results which are very
helpful in developing intuition for our numerical results.
We calibrate the model to Finnish household data and compare the model
dynamics to the recent experience in the Finnish housing market. The Finnish
housing market is a particularly interesting example since it has recently been
hit by two major shocks, a credit market liberalization in the late 1980s,
which resulted into a drastic relaxation of household borrowing constraints,
and a severe depression in the early 1990s. Both episodes were associated
with very large house price changes. Computing the house price dynamics
following similar shocks in the model and comparing them to actual house price
movements helps in understanding the quantitative relevance of the model.
To brieﬂy summarize our results, we ﬁnd, ﬁrst of all, that the model
can explain a large part of the increase in house prices that coincided with
the credit market liberalization as an equilibrium response to an empirically
plausible relaxation of the borrowing constraint. This suggests that the model
captures much of the actual relevance of borrowing constraints to aggregate
housing demand. We also ﬁnd that the remaining borrowing constraint can
substantially shape house price dynamics especially following big adverse
aggregate income shocks. In particular, after the impact eﬀect of a negative
income shock, the borrowing constraint tends to speed up the convergence
towards the new steady state price. Related to this, the borrowing constraint
creates substantial asymmetries in the house price dynamics that follow large
positive and large negative income shocks. The borrowing constraint is much
less important for house price dynamics that are driven by interest rate shocks.
These results are related to the fact that the share of borrowing constrained
households is diﬀerent following diﬀerent shocks.
In the next subsection, we discuss how our paper relates to the previous
literature. In section 2, we describe the model and analyze the role of the
borrowing constraint analytically. In section 3, we discuss the calibration and
7the initial steady state. In section 4, we analyze the dynamics of the model.
We conclude in section 5.
1.1 Related literature and our contribution
Stein (1995) was the ﬁrst to stress the importance of borrowing constraints
for house price dynamics. To see the intuition behind his results, consider
a household that has a house worth 100 000 euros and a mortgage loan of
70 000 euros. It has no other assets or debts, so its net worth is 30 000 euros.
T h eh o u s e h o l dw a n t st om o v et oab i g g e rh o u s e .B a n k sr e q u i r ea2 0 %d o w n
payment. Hence, the household could buy a house worth 150 000 euros, which
is 50 % bigger (in a quality adjusted sense) than its current one. Assume now
that for some reason house prices fall by 10%. This reduces the net worth of
the household to 20 000 euros. As a result, it can buy a house worth only
100 000 euros. Given that house prices have fallen, 100 000 euros will buy
a bigger house than its current one, but only 10% bigger. Hence, because of
the borrowing constraint, a house price fall may induce the household to buy
a smaller house compared to the one it would have bought had house prices
remained constant. In Stein’s model, this link between house prices and buyer
liquidity can give rise to a multiplier mechanism and even multiple equilibria.
Stein’s model is essentially static, as he assumes that all trade takes place
in one period. Ortalo-Magné and Rady (1999, 2006) are able to characterize
how the interplay between aggregate income shocks, homeowners’ capital
gains or losses and borrowing constraints aﬀects house price dynamics and
the transaction volume in a fully dynamic model where houses are available
in two sizes, or ‘property ladders’. Like Stein’s analysis, their analyses are
qualitative rather than quantitative in nature. For instance, in order to keep
the model tractable, Ortalo-Magné and Rady assume preferences that rule
out consumption smoothing: in their model, all consumption of the composite
consumption good takes place in the last period of households’ lives.
Some recent papers incorporate housing with a down payment constraint
into quantitative business cycle models with standard preferences. Iacoviello
(2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2007) are good examples. In these models,
which are designed to analyze monetary policy, there are two types of
households: patient and impatient. In the steady state, the impatient
households are borrowing constrained while the patient households are not.
Dynamics are analyzed around such a steady state. Restricting the analysis to
the neighborhood of a steady state is computationally convenient because one
can then use a linearized version of the model. However, by construction, the
share of borrowing constrained households then remains constant over time.1
To put it very brieﬂy, we contribute to this literature by analyzing the
importance of borrowing constraints for house price dynamics following big
aggregate shocks. Two features of our model are particularly important in
1The multiplier mechanism discussed in Stein (1995) is also close to the ‘credit cycles’
-mechanism in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Cordoba and Ripoll (2005) have analyzed the
quantitative importance of that mechanism with a linearized model.
8this respect. First, we use standard preferences with a consumption smoothing
motive. We show analytically that the consumption smoothing motive is linked
with the multiplier mechanism in question. Second, we solve for the fully
non-linear dynamics. This means here that the fraction of households that
are borrowing constrained may change over time. We show that this feature
is quantitatively very important in the context of big shocks that create large
capital losses or gains to highly leveraged households. We also believe that our
analytical results are helpful in understanding more generally how the liquidity
eﬀect described by Stein (1995) works in a fully dynamic set-up.
However, it should perhaps be stressed that in several important ways, our
model is simpler than the models of Ortalo-Magné and Rady’s (1999, 2006). In
particular, we do not model the timing of the ﬁrst home purchase, which plays
an important role in their analyses. Instead, in our model, all households
are assumed to buy some housing in the ﬁrst period of their economically
independent lives. Also, our model does not provide predictions about the
transaction volume since households can costlessly adjust their housing stock
every period.2
There are many empirical papers analyzing house price dynamics.
Following Case and Shiller (1989), many of them study whether and to what
extent future house price changes are predictable. Some empirical studies also
try to link borrowing constraints and house price dynamics. Lamont and Stein
(1999) relate US city-level house price data to the data on household ﬁnances.
Benito (2006) uses British Household Panel Survey. Both studies estimate the
eﬀect of income shocks on house price dynamics. They show that compared to
other regions, house prices tend to overshoot or undershoot following aggregate
income shocks more in regions where households are highly leveraged. These
results are consistent with the multiplier mechanism à la Stein (1995), but do
not testify to the importance of borrowing constraints for house price dynamics:
households’ asset positions may aﬀect house price dynamics even in the absence
of borrowing constraints. One purpose of this paper is to isolate the importance
of borrowing constraints for house price dynamics in a theoretical set-up.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a model economy with overlapping generations of households.
During the ﬁrst J periods of their lives, households derive utility from
consumption, c, and from the stock of owner housing they have, h.W e
follow Gervais (2002), Davis and Heathcote (2005), and others in assuming
that housing services are proportional to housing capital. In period J +1 ,
they derive a terminal utility that depends only on their remaining net worth.
Each generation is of the same size so that population remains constant over
time.
2Ríos-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2006) have developed a quantitative model with a similar
property ladders -structure as in the models of Ortalo-Magné and Rady. Their model
features also idiosyncratic income uncertainty. However, they present results only for the
stationary equilibrium, where the house price is constant.
9In each generation, there are I diﬀerent household types, indexed by
i =1 ,2,..,I. The intragenerational heterogeneity stems from households
getting children at diﬀerent ages. Children aﬀect household savings behavior
by changing the household size over the life cycle. As we will see, diﬀerences in
the age at which households get children result in large diﬀerences in household
leverage. The mass of households of type i is denoted by mi. We normalize
t h es i z eo fe a c hg e n e r a t i o nt oo n e .T h a ti s
PI
i=1 mi =1 . The periodic earnings
are independent of household type and are denoted by y
j
t.
H o u s i n gi n v o l v e ss o m ed i r e c tc o s t ss u c ha sm a i n t e n a n c ec o s t sa n dp r o p e r t y
taxes. We assume that part of these costs are proportional to the size of the
house and part of them (taxes in particular) are proportional to the value of
the house.3 We denote these two costs by η and κ.T h e r e i s a l s o a ﬁnancial
asset, a. The interest rate that the ﬁnancial asset earns is given by R − 1.
Households face a borrowing constraint which means that they can borrow
only against their housing and that they have to ﬁnance part of their housing
with own equity. Parameter θ ≤ 1 denotes the fraction of the value of the house
that the household has to ﬁnance itself. This kind of borrowing constraint is
often referred to as a down payment requirement. More generally, however,
it can also be used to partly capture maturity constraints. In particular, if
households can only take mortgages with a very short maturity, they have to
pay a relatively large fraction of their housing during the ﬁrst period.
The periodic utility function for j =1 ,...,J is denoted by u(c,h;s),w h e r e
s is the household size. The terminal utility is determined by function v.
The subjective discount factor is β. We use superscripts to denote age of the
household and subscripts to denote type and time period. The problem of a










































where gt = pt + κpt + η. In the utility function, for instance, c
j
i,t,d e n o t e s
consumption of a household of age j and type i in period t,a n dn e tw o r t hi n








3We introduce these two types of costs because they have diﬀerent implications for
equilibrium house prices. For instance, if there are large maintenance costs that are
proportional to the size of the house alone, a large part of the user cost is unrelated to
the house price. As a result, a relatively large change in the steady state house price is
needed in order to create a given percentage change in the total user cost of housing. In
this case, a relatively small change in aggregate household income, for instance, implies a
relatively large change in the equilibrium house price.
10The ﬁrst constraint is the periodic budget constraint where p denotes the price
of housing. The second constraint is the periodic down payment constraint.
We consider a small open economy in the sense that the interest rate and
the wage level are exogenously given. The only aggregate consistency condition
is the market clearing condition for the housing market. We assume that the







i,t = H (2.6)
The Lagrangian for the household’s maximization problem is (we drop here
















































t are the Lagrange multipliers for the budget constraint and
the borrowing constraint for a household of age j at time t.
W en o wd i s c u s st h ei m p o r t a n c eo fs o m es i m p l i f y i n ga s s u m p t i o n sw eh a v e
made. There is no aggregate uncertainty in the model which means that we can
consider only perfect foresight dynamics following completely unanticipated
shocks. Clearly, this limits the way we can compare house price dynamics
in the model to the data. However, with aggregate uncertainty, the model
would become very diﬃcult to solve since we would then have to use recursive
methods with the distribution of households over their asset positions (or
at least some moments describing it) as a state variable. Perfect foresight
dynamics are the easiest way of illustrating how the borrowing constraint
aﬀects house price dynamics.
We also assume that there are no transaction costs. Again, transaction
costs would make it much more diﬃcult to solve the model since the household
problem would then become non-convex and since we would then need a
model with a continuum of households in diﬀerent situations (in order to get a
smooth aggregate demand function).5 The absence of transaction costs means
that households generally adjust their housing position every period, which
is not realistic if the model period is relatively short. It also means that we
cannot consider the dynamics of the transaction volume. However, as we show
4Without loss of generality, the aggregate supply of housing can be normalized to any
strictly positive level. We choose the aggregate supply of housing so that the house price is
equal to 1 in the steady states of the benchmark calibrations.
5Technically, we could handle convex transaction costs but not non-convex transaction
costs, which are realistic in the housing market.
11below, since the demand for housing in our model is aﬀected by changes in
household size (or children), the model nevertheless has the realistic feature
that households undertake major adjustments to their housing only a few times
in their life.
We take the supply of housing as ﬁxed. This reﬂects the fact that our focus
is entirely on the demand side. In any case, we believe that the supply side
is not the key to understand the drastic house price movements that we have
recently observed in Finland (which we describe below). While construction
volume varies a lot over the business cycle, the level of investment is so small
compared to the aggregate stock of housing that the aggregate stock changes
very slowly. Related to this, we abstract from growth. An extended version of
the model with income growth would have a steady state with constant house
prices assuming that the supply of housing increases at the same rate.
2.1 Solving the model
We solve for the transitional dynamics of the economy following diﬀerent
completly unexpected shocks. We assume that it takes up to T periods for the
economy to converge to a new steady state after a shock. Using the household
ﬁrst-order conditions, the budget constraints and the borrowing constraint
together with the housing market equilibrium condition for each period, we

























































i,t +( 1− θ)pth
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i,t = H (2.16)
This set of equations fully characterizes the dynamics of the economy. With a
multi-period life cycle, this is a relatively large system of non-linear equations.
In our calibrated model, it consists of about 2000 equations. We solve this
system using the broydn’s algorithm. When solving the system, we impose
a very strict error tolerance (10−5). Hence, we solve for the dynamics very
accurately. (We also have to check that the solution is not aﬀected by our
guess for T.)
122.2 The borrowing constraint and housing demand
As we discussed in subsection 1.1, the multiplier mechanism in Stein (1995) is
essentially a link between house prices and buyer liquidity. Therefore, before
turning to the numerical analysis, we derive analytically the eﬀect of a marginal
change in current house price on current and future housing demand comparing
the behavior of an unconstrained household to that of a borrowing constrained
household. This helps us to understand how the liquidity eﬀect in Stein works
in a fully dynamic set-up. The results will also be useful when developing
intuition for our numerical results.
Let us consider a household of age 1 <j<J. For notational convenience,
we drop here time, age, and type indices. We denote the housing that the
household owns in the beginning of the current period by h−1 and its housing
in the beginning of the next period by h. Similarly, a−1 and a denote the
holdings of the ﬁnancial asset in the beginning of the current period and in
the beginning of the next period. We further denote current house price by
p, and the next period house price by p0. We assume that the interest rate is
constant over the two periods.
We can write the remaining lifetime utility of the household from next
period onwards as a function of its next period net worth alone. We write it
as V (b),w h e r e
b = Ra + p
0h (2.17)
denotes household’s net worth in the beginning of next period. Function V is
of the same functional form as the utility function. In particular, as long as
the household has a consumption smoothing motive, we have Vbb < 0.A sf o r
the utility function, we assume here, for simplicity, that it is separable between
consumption and housing so that the cross derivative uch =0 .







−1 = c +
µ








a ≥− (1 − θ)ph (2.20)
We ﬁrst ask how the current housing demand, h, of the household depends
on the current house price, given its past housing and savings decisions, a−1
and h−1. The Appendix shows that in the unconstrained case, the eﬀect of a































13where P = p + κp + η −
p0
R and D>0.W ea s s u m eh e r et h a tP>0.
The overall eﬀect consists of three terms. The ﬁrst term is independent of
V . Hence, it is related to the intratemporal resource allocation alone. It is
always negative: An increase in the current house price makes current housing
more expensive relative to current consumption. The other two terms depend
on V and hence they are related to the intertemporal resource allocation.
The second term is also always negative: An increase in the current house
price makes current housing more expensive relative to future consumption
and housing. The third term depends on whether (1 + κ)h is smaller or larger
than h−1. Intuitively, this term is related to an endowment eﬀect: An increase
in the current house price makes the household ‘wealthier’ if h−1 > (1 + κ)h,
that is, if it is a net seller of housing in current period. In that case, the
third term works to increase housing demand when the house price increases.
Note that last two terms would both go to zero if Vbb goes to zero. Without a
consumption smoothing motive, current housing demand would depend only
on the relative price of current housing and current consumption.
When the household faces a binding borrowing constraint, the eﬀect of a
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where T = p + κp + η − (1 − θ)p and S = p0 − R(1 − θ)p and Dc > 0.
We assume here that T>0 and S>0.T h eo v e r a l le ﬀect now consists of
six terms. The ﬁrst term is related to the intratemporal resource allocation
and is negative. The second term is related to the endowment eﬀect, which
is also negative as long as (1 + κ)h>h −1. Hence, these two terms have
the same interpretation as the ﬁrst and the third term in the unconstrained
case. The second term of the unconstrained case is missing here: Because of
the binding borrowing constraint, a marginal change in the relative price of
current and future consumption (or housing) does not have a direct eﬀect on
current demand.
Compared to the above non-constrained case, there are four additional
terms which depend on the borrowing constraint parameter, θ. Assuming that
θ<1, ﬁrst three terms are positive. The ﬁrst two terms come directly from
the borrowing constraint: as the current house price goes up, the household
can borrow more which increases the demand for housing. The third term is
positive: When the household has a consumption smoothing motive (that is
when Vbb < 0) the borrowing constraint prevents it from transferring resources
from future to present. When the current house price increases, this constraint
is relaxed, which also increases current housing demand. These positive terms
m e a n st h a ti np r i n c i p l ea tl e a s t ,t h eb o r r o w i n gc o n s t r a i n tc a nh e r eg i v er i s et o
14a similar multiplier eﬀect as the one discussed in Stein (1995). We will refer
to these terms together as the liquidity eﬀect.
The fourth new term in (2.21) is negative and is related to the cost of
transferring resources to the future. Intuitively, if a borrowing constrained
household wants to save more for future, it buys more housing. When
the current house price increases, this becomes more expensive. This term
mitigates the liquidity eﬀect.
In equilibrium, the current house price depends on both current and future
housing demand. In order to analyze the eﬀect of a change in the current house
price on future housing demand, we note ﬁrst that future housing demand
must depend positively on household’s next period net worth. Hence, we now
consider how next period’s net worth is aﬀected by current house price changes.




















where again D>0. In the constrained case, this eﬀect comes directly through






− R(1 − θ)h,( 2 . 2 3 )
where ∂h
∂p is determined by (2.21).
In our numerical simulations, we have that ∂h
∂p is smaller for the constrained
households than for the unconstrained households but still strictly positive. In
that case, (2.23) shows that a decrease in the current house price must induce
a borrowing constrained household to have a higher next period net worth.
Through this eﬀect, a decrease in the current house price works to increase
next period housing demand. For the unconstrained household, the eﬀect of a
change in the current house price on next period net worth is ambigous as it
depends on the endowment eﬀect.
3 Calibration and the steady state
In this section, we describe the household data we use in the calibration, the
calibration procedure, and the steady state of the model economy.
3.1 Household leverage in the data
We base our calibration on 2004 Wealth Survey conducted by Statistics
Finland, which includes portfolio information from about 2500 Finnish
households. We consider only homeowners. In the survey, they were asked
an estimate of the current market value of their house.
15The importance of borrowing constraints should crucially depend on
household leverage. We characterize household leverage with the net
worth-to-house value ratio (NWHV). Net worth is deﬁned as the sum of the
market value of household’s residential property and its ﬁnancial assets less all
debt. Hence, the lower the NWHV of a household is, the more highly leveraged
it is in the sense that it has more debt or less assets relative to the value of its
house. Negative ratios mean that household’s debts are larger than the value
of its house. The distribution of the NWHV ratios in the data is shown in
Figure 1.










Figure 1. The distribution of net worth-to-house value ratios in
the data
Figure 2 in turn shows the median NWHV ratio in diﬀerent age groups. As
should be expected, the young households are typically much more leveraged
than older households. The median NWHV ratio increases from about 0.25
among households of age 25—29 to about 1.1 among households of age 70—74.











































Figure 2. The median net worth-to-house value ratio in diﬀerent
age groups in the data
3.2 Calibration
The ﬁrst thing to specify in the model is the number of periods in a life
cycle. We take one model period to correspond to ﬁve years and assume that
households’ economically independent life lasts for 10 periods, that is J =1 0 .
We interpret model age 1 as real ages 25—29 and model age 10 as real ages
70—74.
These choices are somewhat arbitrary, of course. However, there are a
number of reasons why we do not want the model period to be much shorter
than ﬁve years. First, the larger is the number of periods in households’ life
cycle, the harder it is to solve the model. With 10 periods, the set of non-linear
equations to be solved here is already quite large. Second, a relatively long
model period also seems more natural given that our model does not feature
transaction costs related to moving. Third, as discussed above, a relatively
long model period also allows us to partly capture maturity constraints with
the borrowing constraint.
We assume three diﬀerent household types, so that I =3 .A s e x p l a i n e d
above, they diﬀer only in the age at which they get children. We assume
that households consist of two adults who get two children in model age 1,
2 or 3 and that children live within the household for four model periods (or
20 years). We compute the corresponding household sizes using the OECD
scale for household consumption units. For instance, for households of type 2
(that get children in model age 2), this means that s1
2 =1 .7,f o rs
j
2 =2 .7,f o r
17j =2 ,3,4,5,a n ds
j
2 =1 .7 for j ≥ 6. We assume m1 = m2 = m3.T h a ti s ,a l l
household types are equally common in the population.
We take the income proﬁle directly from the data. We ﬁrst compute the
average annual non-capital income in age groups 25—29, 30—34,..., 55—59. We
then normalize the income proﬁle so that the average income is one. Finally,
we assume that average income after age 60 is 60% of the normalized average
income. This is close to the current (after tax) replacement rate provided
by the Finnish mandatory pension system. The resulting income proﬁle is
{yj}J
j=1 = {0.87,0.95,1.13,1.11,1.03,1.00,0.90,0.60,0.60,0.60}. We assume




1−σ , for σ>1




1−σ , for σ>1
sαb log(b/s), for σ =1
where b denotes net worth in age J +1 .
We set the interest rate term at R =1 .1. This corresponds closely to the
average yearly real after tax interest rate on mortgage loans during the period
2000-04, which was 1.95%.
We set the cost parameters at κ = η =0 .1. Hence, the annual maintenance
and other direct costs of housing are about 4% of the house value and half of
these costs are related to the house price level. We are then left with the
borrowing constraint parameter, θ, and the preference parameters, σ, β, αc,
and αb. In the benchmark case, we assume that θ =0 .25. This means that
a household is required to make a down payment of 25% of the value of the
house. We think of this a realistic borrowing constraint after the credit market
liberalization. When considering the eﬀects of credit market liberalization, we
will start from a situation where θ is much higher. For comparison, we also
consider the case where there is no borrowing constraint, which is equivalent
t ot h ec a s ew h e r eθ is negative and large in absolute value. Since our results
are likely to depend on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, we consider
two diﬀerent but reasonable values, namely σ =1and σ =3 .
We then have four possible combinations of the borrowing constraint
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. We choose the preference
parameters β, αc,a n dαb for each case separately so that
i) Average NWHV ratio in the model equals the median ratio for households
of age 25—74 in the data.
ii) Average net worth-to-income ratio in the model equals the median ratio
for households of age 25—74 in the data.
iii) Average net worth-to-income in age J equals the median ratio for
households of age 70—74 in the data.
In the data, the median NWHV is 0.9. The median net worth-to-annual income
ratio is 3.0 for all households and 5.0 for households of age 70—74. Since the
model period is ﬁve years, these ratios translate into net worth-to-periodic
income ratios equal to 0.6 for all households and 1.0 for households of age J.
18The resulting parameter combinations are shown in Table 1. Note that in
o r d e rt og e tt h es a m eN W H Vw i t h o u tt h eb o r r o w i n gc o n s t r a i n ta sw i t hi t ,
we have to choose a higher discount factor. This reﬂects the fact that the
borrowing constraint limits household borrowing.6
β αc αb
σ =1 , θ =0 .25 0.904 0.809 0.868
σ =3 , θ =0 .25 0.896 0.809 1.072
σ =1 , no borr. constr. 0.922 0.808 0.812
σ =3 , no borr. constr. 0.947 0.808 0.887
Table 1: Parameter combinations.
3.3 The steady state
Figure 3 displays the steady state housing proﬁles, hj,f o rt h et h r e ed i ﬀerent
household types in the case with logarithmic preferences (these proﬁles are not
scaled by household size, s). Consumption proﬁles (not shown) are similar.
Consider ﬁrst households of type 3. These households get children at model
age 3. They are never borrowing constrained and hence their housing follows
closely household size. They move to a bigger house when they get children
at age 3, and move to a smaller house at age 7. In contrast, households of
type 1, who get children at age 1, are borrowing constrained until model age
4. This distorts their housing (and consumption) proﬁles over the life cycle.
Households of type 2 are an intermediate case: they are borrowing constrained
at ages 2 and 5.
Because of the absence of transaction costs, housing does not remain exactly
constant between any two periods. These proﬁles are realistic, however, in the
sense that in any time period, a small fraction of households wish to make
major adjustments in their housing.
6When comparing the dynamics with and without the borrowing constraint, we could also
keep all other parameter values ﬁxed. Then, however, the initial distributions of household
leverage in the model would be very diﬀerent in the two cases.






















Figure 3. Housing proﬁles over the life cycle in steady state
Figure 4 displays the corresponding proﬁles for NWHV ratios as well as
the average NWHV in diﬀerent age groups. As in the data, it is the young
households that are highly leveraged. The lowest NWHV allowed by the down
payment constraint is 0.25. For all household types, the NWHV ratio is smaller
than one during the ﬁrst ﬁve periods.





















Figure 4. Net worth-to-house value ratios over the life cycle
20Table 2 compares the distribution of household leverage in the data to the
model when θ =0 .25. For the table, we have divided the households into four
groups according to their NWHV ratio and calculated the share of households
in each group (in the model, these shares are exactly the same for σ =1and
σ =3 ). As the table shows, this distribution is more dispersed in the data
than in the model. In the data, some households report to have NWHV less
than 0.25, which is the lowest NWHV we allow for in the model. On the other
hand, the model economy also features too few households with NWHV larger
than one.
Net worth-to-house value ratio
< 0.25 0.25 − 0.5 0.5 − 1.0 > 1.0
Data 6.7% 8.6% 28% 57%
Model (θ =0 .25) 0% 30% 27% 43%
Table 2: Share of households with diﬀerent net worth-to-house value ratios.
4D y n a m i c s
In this section, we analyze numerically the dynamics of the model following
diﬀerent shocks. We ﬁrst describe, in subsection 4.1, recent house price
dynamics in Finland as well as the evolution of per capita income and real
after-tax interest rates. In subsection 4.2, we consider a sudden relaxation of
the borrowing constraint that is similar to the one that was associated with
the Finnish credit market liberalization in the late 1980s, and compare the
price dynamics in the model to the data. Our aim is to see to what extent
the model can explain the housing boom of the late 80s as a response to an
empirically plausible relaxation of the household borrowing constraints.
In subsection 4.3, we consider how the remaining borrowing constraint
shapes house price dynamics following big aggregate income and interest rate
shocks. In subsection 4.4, we look at how a marginal change in the current
house price aﬀects housing demand at individual level. There, our aim is to
provide further intuition for the results in subsection 4.3. In addition, this
exercise allows us to discuss the possibility of multiple equilibria. In the last
subsection, we consider a sequence of shocks where credit market liberalization
is followed by a big adverse income shock. Our aim is to see how the fact that
the credit market liberalization took place just before the depression, should
have aﬀected the house price dynamics following the Finnish depression.
214.1 The Finnish boom-bust-boom cycle
Figure 5 displays real house prices over the period of 1980—2006. It shows
that real house prices ﬁrst increased by about 50% from 1986 to 1989 and
then fell by about 50% from 1989 to 1993. The boom was associated with a
credit market liberalization that took place in the late 1980s. Before that, the
Finnish banking system was highly regulated with tightly controlled and low
lending rates which resulted in credit rationing. The abolition of interest rate
controls in 1986 induced a huge growth of credit (see Koskela et al, 1992, and
Laakso, 2000).



































Figure 5. Real house prices in Finland7
The following bust coincided with a severe depression. Figure 6 shows the
growth of real GDP per capita over the period of 1980—2006 as well as real
after-tax mortgage interest rates. Real GDP decreased by over 10% from 1990
to 1993. Of course, such an income shock must have large eﬀects on house
prices.
After tax real interest rates have also varied a lot. To a large extent this
has been due to relatively short-run changes in nominal interest rates and
inﬂation. However, there has been at least one major shock which was of
a more permanent nature. Until 1992, interest payments were deductible in
general income taxation with average marginal rates close to 50%. In 1993,
Finland moved to a dual tax system, where labor and capital income are taxed
separately. In the new system, a tax payer could deduct 25% (the tax rate on
capital income) of interest expenditures related to housing loans from taxes.
The system has remained basically the same since 1993.8
7The source for the house price index series is Bank of Finland.
8However, the capital income tax has been increased to 28%.
















Figure 6. The growth rate of real GDP per capita and real after
tax mortgage interest rate9
In what follows, we will ﬁrst consider a similar relaxation of the borrowing
constraint as the one that was associated with the credit market liberalization
in the late 80s. We will then consider aggregate income and interest rate
shocks that are of the same order of magnitude as those associated with the
depression and the 1993 tax reform.
Speciﬁcally, when studying the eﬀects of a relaxation of the borrowing
constraint, we ﬁrst solve for the steady state with a very tight borrowing
constraint. In Finland, before the credit market liberalization, there
was eﬀectively credit rationing, and households were constrained by very
short mortgage maturities. Based on discussions with market experts, our
understanding is that for most households, it was impossible to get a mortgage
w i t ham a t u r i t ya b o v e8y e a r s .I na d d i t i o n, households typically needed to pay
a down payment of around 30% of the house value. (See also Koskela et al,
1992). While we don’t have a maturity constraint formally in the model, we
can partly capture it by increasing the borrowing constraint parameter θ.F o r
a typical mortgage contract, a mortgage maturity of 8 years together with a
down payment constraint of 30% means that a household needs to pay about
75% of the value of its new house investment during the ﬁrst ﬁve years. This
translates into θ =0 .75.
As for the income shock, we note ﬁr s tt h a tb e t w e e n1 9 00—1989, real GDP
per capita has increased, on average, 11.8% every ﬁve years. In the ﬁve year
9T h es o u r c ef o rt h eG D Ps e r i e si sS t a t i s t i c sF i nland and the source for the interest rate
series is Oikarinen (2007).
23period 1990—1994, however, the real GDP per capita decreased by 9.8%.10 If
we assume that just before the depression, households expected their income
to keep growing at the average rate of 11.8%, the depression meant that by
the end of the following ﬁve year period, household income was approximately
20% lower than expected.11 Hence, when considering an adverse income shock
that mimics the Finnish depression, we assume that income suddenly falls by
20%.
Of course, an important question is then how the depression changed
expectations about future income. If we simply estimate an AR(1) process
for the ﬁve year real GDP per capita growth, xt, we get the following
xt =0 .11 + 0.13xt−1 (4.1)
This suggests that the eﬀect of the depression on the level of aggregate income
should be more or less permanent. On the other hand, the Finnish economy
has been growing quite fast after the depression which means that the level of
real GDP has partly recovered towards its previous trend. It is possible that
households were able to anticipate that. We consider both permanent and
temporary shocks.
As for the interest rate shock associated with the 1993 tax reform, it should
ﬁr s tb en o t e dt h a tt h ee ﬀect of the lower deduction rate on the real after
tax interest rate depends on nominal interest rates: the higher the nominal
interest rate, the larger is the increase on the real after tax rate. However,
even assuming a relatively low nominal interest rate (5%), the eﬀect is at least
a 1%-point increase in the real annual after tax interest rate. This corresponds
to an increase in R from 1.1 to roughly 1.15.
4.2 Relaxation of the borrowing constraint
Here we consider the transitionary dynamics following a sudden reduction of θ
from 0.75 to 0.25. Initially, the economy is in a steady state. We consider the
preference parameter combinations given in the ﬁrst two lines of table 1 with
σ =1and σ =3 . The initial house price is diﬀerent for the two calibrations.
By construction, the new steady state house price equals 1 in both cases.
Figure 7 displays house price dynamics following the shock. Period 1
corresponds to the initial steady statew i t hat i g h tb o r r o w i n gc o n s t r a i n t
(θ =0 .75). The shock takes place in period 2.
Following the relaxation of the borrowing constraint, house prices ﬁrst
increase and then decline steadily towards a new steady state level. The reason
why the house price increases on impact is simple: initially, the only thing
that changes is that young, borrowing constrained households can buy more
housing. Hence, the house price must go up. After the impact eﬀect, the
10Disposable household income decreased by roughly the same amount.
11That is, if aggregate income is 1 in period t, households expected it to be 1.118 in period
t+1. Given the income shock, the realized aggregate income in period t+1is 0.902 instead
of 1.118. The diﬀerence is 19.3%.
24house price starts to decrease but remains higher than in the initial steady
state. The reason to this gradual reduction in house price is the following:
After the credit market liberalization, the young households borrow more than
previously. Hence, they will be less wealthy at old age than the previous
generations. Therefore, future generations demand less housing when old than















































Figure 7. House price dynamics following a relaxation of the
borrowing constraint
The impact eﬀect is a house price increase of 11% with σ =1and 20%
with σ =3 . In the latter case, the model explains almost half of the about
50% increase in house prices that followed the credit market liberalization in
Finland. This suggests that the model captures a large part of the empirical
relevance of borrowing constraints for house price dynamics.
4.3 Income and interest rate shocks
We now consider income and interest rate shocks. As we explained above, we
consider income shocks that are of a similar magnitude as the fall in GDP
during the Finnish depression. We consider both permanent and temporary
income shocks. And in order to highlight the non-linearities of the model, we
consider also positive income shocks.
25W ea s s u m et h a tt h ei n c o m es h o c k sa ﬀect all households equiproportionally.
Speciﬁcally, in the case of a permanent shock, we simply multiply y
j
t by 0.8
or 1.2 from period 1 onwards. In the case of a temporary shock, we assume
that aggregate income converges back to its initial level in four periods and
multiply y
j
t by either 0.80, 0.86, and 0.93 or 1.2, 1.13, and 1.06 in periods 1,
2, and 3, respectively. We assume that the economy is initially in a steady
state (with θ =0 .25). Households make their period 1 decisions after learning
about the shock.
Figures 8 and 9 display the house price dynamics following the diﬀerent
income shocks. We have four diﬀerent shocks and for all four shocks, we
consider 4 cases: with and without the borrowing constraint and with σ =1
and σ =3 . By construction, the initial house price in period 0 is equal to 1 in
all cases.
The ﬁrst thing to note from the ﬁg u r e si st h a tt h eb o r r o w i n gc o n s t r a i n t
shapes the price dynamics substantially only following negative shocks:
following positive shocks, the price dynamics are remarkably similar with and
without the borrowing constraint. Inspection of the dynamics after negative
shocks (top part in Figures 8 and 9) suggests that the most important eﬀect of
the borrowing constraint is that it makes the house price increase more rapidly
f r o mpe r i od1t ope r i od2 .T h i sm e a n st h a tthere are relatively large anticipated
capital gains to housing. Depending on whether we have a permanent or
a temporary shock and on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, these
capital gains are about 2%—5% of the value of the house from period 1 to
period 2.
The intuition behind this result is the following. The house price fall that
follows a negative shock eﬀectively tightens the borrowing constraint for those
households for which it is binding. This reduces period 1 housing demand
through the liquidity eﬀect that we discussed in subsection 2.2. For the
housing market to clear in period 1, the liquidity eﬀe c tm u s tb eo ﬀset by
suﬃciently large capital gains to housing from period 1 to period 2, which
induce households, especially those that are not borrowing constrained, to
demand more housing already in period 1.
One might think that having these large anticipated capital gains means
that the period 1 house price is much lower with a borrowing constraint than
without it. This seems to be true in the case of a temporary negative income
shock. With σ =3 , the period 1 house price is about 40% lower with the
borrowing constraint than without it. However, in the case of a permanent
shock, the impact eﬀect is almost the same with and without the borrowing
constraint. As we showed in subsection 2.2, a fall in current house price may
decrease the future housing demand of unconstrained households but increase
the future housing demand of constrained households. This is what happens
here. In the case of a permanent and negative income shock, the housing
demand just after period 1 is substantially higher with the borrowing constraint
than without it. Hence, the anticipated capital gain that is needed to oﬀset
the liquiduity eﬀect is created by a relatively high house price in period 2,
rather than by a very low house price in period 1.
The fact that the borrowing constraint matters with negative income shocks
but not with positive income shocks implies that the price dynamics are
26quite asymmetric between positive and negative income shocks. The intuition
behind this result is the following. In principle, the same mechanism that
creates large anticipated capital gains following the impact eﬀect of a negative
income shock should create large anticipated capital losses in the case of a
positive income shock. However, following a large positive income shock,
the share of borrowing constrained households is very small: following the
permanent positive shock considered above, the share of borrowing constrained
households decreases from 6/30 in the initial steady state to 1/30 in period 1.12
Therefore, a marginal increase in period 1 house price from the equilibrium
price has a very small impact on the aggregate housing demand through the
borrowing constraint. Consequently, following a large positive income shock,
there is no need for large anticipated capital losses in balancing the supply
a n dd e m a n df o rh o u s i n gi np e r i o d1 . I nc o n t r a s t ,f o l l o w i n gal a r g en e g a t i v e
income shock, the share of borrowing constrained households increases to 8/30





















































































Figure 8. House price dynamics following negative (top) and
positive (bottom) permanent income shocks



















































































Figure 9. House price dynamics following negative (top) and
positive (bottom) temporary income shocks
Figures 10 and 11 display the house price dynamics following the four
diﬀerent interest rate shocks. In the initial steady state R =1 .1 and the house
price is equal to 1 in all cases. We consider a permanent increase to R =1 .15
and a permanent decrease to R =1 .05. The temporary shock lasts for three
p e r i o d s :I nt h ec a s eo fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t e ,w eh a v eR1 =1 .15,
R2 =1 .13,R 3 =1 .12. In the case of a decrease in the interest rate, we have
R1 =1 .05,R 2 =1 .07,R 3 =1 .09.
Consider ﬁrst the permanent shocks. There are now substantial diﬀerences
in steady state eﬀects with and without the borrowing constraint. The
steady state eﬀects are larger without the borrowing constraint, except for an
interest rate increase in the logarithmic case. Apart from that, the borrowing
constraint seems to shape price dynamics much less than in the case of
(negative) income shocks. In the case of temporary shocks, the house price
dynamics are almost identical with and without the borrowing constraint.
The reason why the borrowing constrained does not substantially aﬀect
house price dynamics following these interest rate shocks is related to the fact
that now the share of borrowing constrained households does not change much
on impact. An increase in the interest rate, for instance, induces a fall in the
house price which tends to tighten the borrowing constraint. However, this
eﬀect is balanced by households’ willingness to save more. A similar argument
holds for the decrease in the interest rate: a lower interest rate reduces the
cost of housing, thereby increasing demand and pushing up the house price.
This tends to relax the borrowing constraint for all households. At the same
28time, however, a lower interest rate makes borrowing more attractive, thereby




















































































Figure 10. House price dynamics following a permanent increase























































































Figure 11. House price dynamics following a temporary increase
(top) and decrease (bottom) in the interest rate
4.4 The eﬀects of a marginal house price change
As we discussed in section 2, a change in the house price aﬀects the demand for
housing through various channels. The multiplier eﬀect stressed in Stein (1995)
relates to the fact that a fall in the house price may reduce buyer liquidity
through the down payment requirement. This leads borrowing constrained
households to demand less housing when the price falls. If this eﬀect dominates
in the aggregate demand response, there could even be multiple equilibria.
This issue can be investigated in our setting in the following way. First, we
compute the equilibrium house price sequence following a permanent income
shock in period 1 (the corresponding house price dynamics are shown in the
top part of Figure 8). We then decrease the period 1 house price by 1%
leaving other prices unchanged, and solve again the problem of all households.13
Finally, we compute the change (from the level related to the equilibrium price
dynamics) in housing demand for diﬀerent household types and cohorts for
periods 1 and 2. This gives us a measure of the elasticity of housing demand
around the equilibrium path. As discussed above, for there to be potential
for multiple equilibria, for some households at least, this price decrease should
depress housing demand in period 1.
13This is a partial equilibrium exercise in the sense that with this new house price sequence,
the demand for housing will no longer equal supply in every period.
30Figure 12 shows the results for type 2 households of diﬀerent ages with
σ =1in periods 1 and 2. Following the negative income shock, households
of age 2—5 are borrowing constrained.14 The line with stars shows period 1
demand of diﬀerent cohorts and the line with circles shows period 2 demand.
To understand the ﬁgure, consider a household that is of age 2 in period 1
and, hence, of age 3 in period 2. The ﬁgure tells us that the (additional) 1%
reduction in period 1 house price increases housing demand of this household
in period 1 by about 1.6% and period 2 by 0.7%. For the household of age 1
in period 2, there is no demand change, as this household did not experience
the ‘disturbance’ in period 1.








































Figure 12. Changes in housing demands following a 1% decrease
in p1
The ﬁgure shows that a decrease in the period 1 house price increases the
housing demand of all households of type 2 in period 1. Hence, in this sense,
the liquidity eﬀect does not dominate and there seems to be no scope for
multiple equilibria. On the other hand, it is also the case that the variation
in the demand response is large. In particular, the demand increase of the
borrowing constrained households (of age 2—5) is much more modest than that
of other cohorts. Hence, the borrowing constraint does substantially reduce
the elasticity of housing demand to the current house price changes.
Finally, the ﬁgure shows, consistently with our analytical results in 2.2, that
a fall in the current house price induces the borrowing constrained households
to demand more housing in the following period. Intuitively, by eﬀectively
tightening the borrowing constraint, a fall in the current house prices forces
14Type 2 households get children at age 2 and the children live with the parents for four
model periods.
31households to save more. This induces them to demand more housing in
the future. Those households who are not borrowing constrained in contrast
demand less housing in the following period. For them, the only eﬀect is that
housing becomes cheaper in the current period. This induces them to buy
more housing in the current period and less housing (and consumption goods)
in the future.
4.5 Mimicking the Finnish boom-bust-boom cycle
We now consider a sequence of shocks, where ﬁrst the borrowing constraint is
relaxed and then, in the following period, the economy is hit by the depression
which consists both of an income and interest rate shock as we think was the
case in the Finnish depression. Our main interest is in seeing how the fact that
the credit market liberalization took place just before the depression should
have aﬀected the house price dynamics following the depression.
Figure 13 shows the results. The initial steady state, with a tight borrowing
constraint (θ =0 .75), is now period 0. In period 1, the borrowing constraint
is relaxed, and in period 2, the depression hits the economy. For comparison,
we also display, in the same ﬁgure, the price dynamics that would follow the
depression if the economy was in a steady state (with θ =0 .25)i np e r i o d
1. The interpretation of this case is that the credit market liberalization has
taken place well before the depression. In that case, the price stays constant
from period 0 to period 1. The permanent and temporary income and interest
rate shocks analyzed here are the same as the negative shocks considered in
the previous subsection. We consider here only the case with σ =3 .
The ﬁgure shows that according to the model, the credit market
liberalization should have dampened the house price dynamics following the
depression. In the case where the depression was preceded by a relaxation
of the borrowing constraint, house prices stay at a higher level during the
depression and increase more gradually after the depression. There are two
reasons for this. First, as shown in Figure 7, the relaxation of the borrowing
constraint alone should sustain higher, but gradually falling house prices for
decades. Second, given that the borrowing constraint has just been relaxed, few
households are borrowing constrained when the depression hits the economy.
Both of these eﬀects smooth away part of the undershooting in house prices
that would have followed the depression had it not been preceded by the credit
market liberalization.
Comparing these price dynamics with the empirical data in Figure 5 shows
that when the depression is modelled with permanent income and interest
rate shocks, the impact eﬀect of the depression is similar to that in the data.
That is, house price fall by about 50%. However, in the model, prices then
stay almost constant following the depression, whereas in reality house prices
increased quite rapidly after the depression. When the depression is modelled
with temporary shocks, house prices do increase substantially following the
depression. However, with temporary shock, the impact eﬀect is then far too
modest.
32A plausible explanation for why house prices ﬁrst fell so much and then
recovered is that in the depression, households expected the income and
interest rate shocks to be permanent and were positively surprised by the
strong income growth and lower interest rate after the depression. We do not
attempt to model these surprises, because that would not yield new insights
into how the borrowing constraint aﬀects the dynamics. Moreover, to fully
address these issues, we would clearly need a stochastic model.
































Figure 13. Mimicking the Finnish boom-bust-boom cycle:
p e r m a n e n t( l e f t )a n dt e m p o r a r y( r i g h t )s h o c k s
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We have analyzed how a household borrowing constraint aﬀects house price
dynamics in an OLG model with standard preferences. We found that in
certain situations, the borrowing constraint can shape house price dynamics
substantially. However, the eﬀe c to ft h eb o r r o w i n gc o n s t r a i n ti sv e r yd i ﬀerent
following diﬀerent shocks. Because of the borrowing constraint, the house
price dynamics following large positive and negative shocks can also be quite
asymmetric. These results are related to the fact that share of borrowing
constrained households changes over time.
We believe that our results have some implications for empirical work.
The literature (Lamont and Stein, 1999 and Benito, 2006) has tried to identify
33the eﬀect of borrowing constraints on house price dynamics by comparing the
house price dynamics following income shocks between regions where household
leverage diﬀers; borrowing constraints should matter more in regions where
many households are highly leveraged. However, this literature has implicitly
assumed that the price dynamics are symmetric for positive and negative
shocks. Our results suggest that we could learn more about the importance of
borrowing constraints by considering separately positive and negative income
shocks, and perhaps also relatively small and big shocks.
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36Appendix
Housing demand and the eﬀect of price changes
In this appendix, we derive the results of subsection 2.2. illustrating the eﬀect of a
change in pt for the housing demand and savings decision of household generation
j in period t.
No borrowing constraint
Assuming that the borrowing constraint is not binding, the ﬁrst-order conditions
related to the household problem (2.18)—(2.20) are
uc − λ =0
uh − λ
µ









Combining the ﬁrst-order conditions and using the budget constraint gives a system
of three equations and three unknowns
uc − βRVb =0
uh − Pu c =0
y + ph
−1 + Ra
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Borrowing constraint
Assume now that the household faces a binding borrowing constraint. Then







−1 = c +( p + κp + η − (1 − θ)p)h
where
b =( p
0 − R(1 − θ)p)h
The ﬁrst-order conditions then become
uc − λ =0
uh + βSVb − λT =0
where T = p + κp + η − (1 − θ)p and S = p0 − R(1 − θ)p. Combining the two
ﬁrst-order conditions and using the budget constraint gives two equations with two
unknowns
uh + βSVb − ucT =0
y + ph
−1 + Ra
−1 − c − Th =0
Diﬀerentiating with respect to p gives
µ









R(1 − θ)βVb + βSVbbR(1 − θ)+uc (κ + θ)





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
uhh + βVbbS2 −uccT
−T −1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ = −uhh − βVbbS
2 − uccT
2 > 0
and therefore, we have
=
1
Dc[−R(1 − θ)βVb − SβVbbR(1 − θ)
−uc (κ + θ)+uccT
¡






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
R(1 − θ)βVb + SβVbbR(1 − θ)+uc (1 + κ − (1 − θ)) −uccT
(1 + κ − (1 − θ))h − h−1 −1




Dc[−R(1 − θ)βVb − SβVbbR(1 − θ)
−uc (κ + θ)+uccT
¡
(1 + κ − (1 − θ))h − h
−1¢
]




−uc (1 + κ)+uccT ((1 + κ)h − h−1)
Dc
+












− R(1 − θ)h
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